Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's Commuter Rail Operations
JANUARY 18, 2011 · Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · Read the full official report (PDF) ↗ · official site ↗
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“Our review of the MBTA's five-year Operating Agreement with MBCR revealed a number of deficiencies in the oversight and management of this contract.”
Read the plain-English breakdown
This is a State Auditor report reviewing how the MBTA awarded and oversaw its commuter rail operating contract with Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Company.
“Our review of the MBTA was conducted to determine the overall effectiveness of the MBTA’s awarding and oversight of the contract with MBCR to operate and maintain the MBTA’s commuter rail system.”
Auditors looked at whether MBCR followed contract rules, whether the MBTA monitored MBCR properly, and whether the MBTA collected penalties when MBCR did not perform as required.
“Specifically, we reviewed whether: (1) MBCR is adhering to contract requirements for on-time performance, vehicle maintenance, track maintenance, and safety standards; (2) the MBTA is adequately monitoring the activities of MBCR and ensuring that contract requirements are being adhered to; and (3) the MBTA is assessing and collecting all contractual liquidated damages for non-performance.”
The report matters because the contract was worth more than $1 billion and involved public money used to run commuter rail service.
“In December 2002, the MBTA's Board of Directors authorized the execution of an Operating Agreement for commuter rail operations services for the five-year period July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2008 with MBCR for an amount not to exceed $1,072,194,212 ($1,050,080,812 for basic services plus $22,113,400 for Greenbush Line service).”
If you ride commuter rail or pay Massachusetts taxes, this affects you because the audit says weak oversight may have cost the MBTA money that could otherwise support service or reduce financial pressure.
“In order to ensure that all contractor responsibilities under any future commuter rail contract are being met and that the taxpayers’ interests are being adequately safeguarded, the MBTA should:”
The auditor found three big problems: double billing for certain labor, questionable incentives and fees, and major reductions or waivers of penalties for poor performance.
“Ultimately, by eliminating, reducing, reallocating, and placing monthly caps on penalties, the MBTA rewarded MBCR by as much as $42.9 million in uncollected and waived penalties for contract nonperformance reported by MBCR from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2008.”
The auditor recommended that the MBTA stop allowing double billing, strengthen oversight, limit questionable markups and incentives, and fully collect penalties in future contracts.
“Finally, for any new commuter rail contract issued by the MBTA, the penalties to be imposed for contract noncompliance should be fully collected to demonstrate to all future commuter rail operators, and to the riding public, that the MBTA intends to hold its commuter rail contractor fully accountable for all service violations and contract noncompliance.”
The report is significant because it says contract amendments and oversight choices may have shifted large costs away from the contractor and onto the MBTA.
“Finally, the practice of continually amending the performance requirements of the contract to unjustly reward the operational inadequacies of MBCR sends the wrong message as to the price MBCR will ultimately pay, if any, for failing to fully earn its $1 billion contract fee.”
“Force Account work” means extra work outside the basic contract, billed by time and materials, often for capital improvements or special projects.
“Force Account work is work performed under contract that is billed as time and material.”
9 figure(s) pending source verification - not shown
What the Auditor checked
- Partially Determine whether MBCR is adhering to contract requirements for on-time performance, vehicle maintenance, track maintenance, and safety standards.
- Partially Determine whether the MBTA is adequately monitoring the activities of MBCR and ensuring that contract requirements are being adhered to.
- Did not comply Determine whether the MBTA is assessing and collecting all contractual liquidated damages for non-performance.
What the Auditor found
Why it matters: The amendment increased MBCR revenues by $11.2 million and could increase them by as much as $41.2 million by contract expiration.
Standard: Sections 18 and 21 and Exhibit 9 of the original Operating Agreement prohibited additional straight-time labor charges for Force Account work performed by full-time agreement-services personnel. ( Exhibit 9 of the original Operating Agreement )
2 recommendations
- If the MBTA cannot amend the contract, it should postpone non-emergency Force Account work and competitively bid that work.agency: disagreed
- The MBTA board should require comprehensive financial analyses of all future proposed contract amendments to determine whether prior board review and approval is required.agency: agreed
Agency response & Auditor reply
Agency: "Amendment Four did not result in increased revenues of $11.2 million, nor did it allow for “double-billing” by MBCR as the Draft Report concludes."
Auditor: "Contrary to the MBTA’s statements, our presentation of the manner in which the Force Account staffing and charges under this contract were misapplied is both accurate and fair."
Why it matters: The MBTA paid $1.7 million in fiscal year 2009 revenue growth incentives and risked rewarding MBCR for basic contract duties or external ridership factors.
Standard: Section 20 of the original Operating Agreement and Amendment No. 5 established the Revenue Growth Incentive. ( Section 20 of the original Operating Agreement; Amendment No. 5 to the original contract )
1 recommendation
- The MBTA should refrain from granting future revenue and performance incentives that reward the contractor for simply fulfilling basic contract duties.agency: disagreed
Agency response & Auditor reply
Agency: "The Draft Report criticizes the revenue growth incentive included within the Agreement, but the report’s conclusions appear to rest on factual errors and a lack of context."
Auditor: "We reiterate that to offer a financial incentive to the contractor to simply perform one of the most basic duties under this billion dollar contract is unwarranted."
Why it matters: MBCR may have received approximately $800,000 in questionable or improper management fees and markups.
Standard: The Operating Agreement allowed an 8% management fee for approved Force Account Project Initiatives and Section 21.4(b) allowed 2% markups for bulk purchases and 8% for non-bulk materials.
2 recommendations
- The MBTA should discontinue allowing the contractor to purchase items on the MBTA's behalf and mark up the cost by 8%.agency: agreed
- The MBTA should designate all future MBCR Force Account materials purchases as bulk items eligible only for a 2% markup, with specialty items purchased directly by the MBTA.agency: agreed
Agency response & Auditor reply
Agency: "The MBTA intends to implement several of the Draft Report’s recommendations regarding Contractor oversight."
Auditor: "Finally, we commend the MBTA for its stated intention to implement several of our recommendations to improve its oversight of the MBCR’s activities."
Why it matters: The MBTA did not collect as much as $42.9 million in penalties, weakening accountability for service violations and contract noncompliance.
Standard: Section 22 of the contract provided for monetary penalties when MBCR failed to meet minimum operating standards. ( Section 22 of the contract; Section 22 and Exhibit 10 (Penalties) of the Operating Agreement )
3 recommendations
- The MBTA should restore the penalties contained in the original service contract.agency: disagreed
- The MBTA should assess and collect all penalty assessments due.agency: disagreed
- For any new commuter rail contract, the MBTA should fully collect penalties for contract noncompliance.agency: disagreed
Agency response & Auditor reply
Agency: "The MBTA disputes the Draft Report’s conclusion that the amendments to the Agreement resulted in any “penalties forgiven,” for the reasons set forth below."
Auditor: "Contrary to the MBTA’s assertions, our conclusions regarding the effects of its continual dilution of the penalties that could be assessed to the MBCR for nonperformance are accurate and fair."
Verified dollar findings
Money the entity was owed but failed to assess or collect - unassessed penalties, underpaid incentives.
Estimated or sample-projected amounts - shown separately because they are not a hard-identified dollar figure.
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